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RESOURCE PARTITIONING AND THE EVOLUTION OF
SPECIALIST ORGANIZATIONS: THE ROLE OF LOCATION
AND IDENTITY IN THE U.S. WINE INDUSTRY
ANAND SWAMINATHAN
University of California, Davis
Analyses of founding and mortality rates of specialist organizations in the U.S. wine
industry over the period 1941-90 support GarroU's (1985) location-based resource-parti-
tioning model—crowding of generalists in the market center creates opportunities for
specialists. Further, specialists are adversely aifected when they violate Üieir organiza-
tional form's identity characteristics and also when generalists can assimie a robust
identity allowing them to operate in both specialist and generalist industry segments. The
results suggest a prominent role for an organizational form's identity in resource parti-
tioning.
The proliferation of specialist organizations in
mature industries is consistent with an ecological
model of resource partitioning (Carroll, 1985). Ma-
ture industries typically feature a high degree of
market concentration. With increasing concentra-
tion, generalists tend to compete vigorously for the
center of the market, thus allowing specialists to
thrive on the periphery. The generalist-specialist
distinction revolves around the concept of an organ-
izational form that embodies not only structural
features, Ijut also the environmental factors that
define the form's niche (Hannan & Freeman, 1989).
Ecological theories of niche width contain a simple
distinction between generalist and specialist or-
ganizational forms. When an organizational subpo-
pulation's niche encompasses a wide range of re-
sources, the subpopulation is composed of
generalists. Conversely, when an organizational
subpopulation's niche includes a narrow range of
resources, it is composed of specialists. According
to the resource-partitioning model, when markets
concentrate, the death rate of generalist organiza-
tions will increase, and that of specialist organiza-
tions will decrease. At the same time, the model
predicts that the founding rate of generalists will
decrease and that of specialists will increase with
market concentration. This view of resource parti-
tioning implies that differing locations in a re-
source space of generalists and specialists account
for variations in founding and mortality rates.
In this article, I extend the location-based re-
source-partitioning model by exploring the role of
the identity of specialist and generalist organiza-
tional forms in resource partitioning within the
post-Prohibition American wine industry. The
identity of farm wineries is tied to their claims of
authenticity. Farm wineries are perceived as being
small organizations with the high-quality products
typically associated with vineyard ownership.
Farm wineries that violate these identity character-
istics of their organizational form should experi-
ence poor performance. In the traditional resource-
partitioning model, it is assumed that the generalist
and specialist organizations are segregated into
separate resource spaces. Generalist organizations,
however, can benefit ftom the growth of the spe-
cialist segment by assuming robust identities, which
may allow them to operate in both resource spaces.
The success of generalist organizations in establish-
ing robust identities will depress the founding rate
and elevate the mortality rate of specialist organiza-
tions. I examined the impact of two strategies, in-
creased brand proliferation and advertising intensity,
used by mass-production wineries to achieve robust
identities in the wine industry. Hypotheses about
identity-based resource partitioning were tested us-
ing life history data on specialist organizations in the
post-Prohibition American wine industry.
SPECIALIST ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.S.
WINE INDUSTRY, 1940-90
The post-Prohibition American wine industry
featured increasing consolidation. At the beginning
of the observation period in 1940, 989 wineries
were in operation.^ This number declined almost
continuously over the study period to a minimum
I would like to thank William Barnett, Will Mitchell,
Joel Podolny, and Jim Walsh for their insightful com-
ments on an earlier version of this article.
^ By wineries, I refer to wine-making firms. Even in
1940 there were 45 U.S. wine-making firms with more
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of 330 in 1967. Observers of the wine industry
attribute industry consolidation to two factors—the
operation of economies of scale and acquisitions of
small and medium-sized wineries, often by firms
ftom outside the industry.
Despite the reduction in numbers, industry sales
continued to rise. Total domestic shipments by
American wineries rose ftom 86.1 million gallons
in 1940 to 440.9 million gallons in 1990. Large
firms, such as United Vintners, E&J Callo, and
Cuild Wineries, achieved most of these sales gains,
at the expense of the smaller producers. This trend
is reflected in increasing levels of industry concen-
tration over this period. An indicator of industry
concentration that is highly correlated with the
four-firm sales concentration ratio is the share of
industry capacity held by the largest four firms.
According to an industry publication. Wines &
Vines, this ratio increased ftom 23 percent in 1940
to 52.4 percent in 1990.
Since 1967, the number of wineries has increased
rapidly, growing to 1,327 by 1990. This spurt in
numbers is largely the result of the founding of
wineries with a specialist organizational form—
farm wineries. The number of farm wineries in the
United States that were in operation for all or part
of 1990 stood at 1,140. Farm wineries typically
manufacture premium, varietal wines, often from a
designated vineyard, operating on a relatively
small scale. These wineries have variously been
called "boutique," "chateau," and "small" winer-
ies. I followed Adams (1985: 537) in calling this
specialist organizational form a "farm winery."
Current federal regulations authorize the use of a
varietal name for a wine that derives 75 percent of
its volume and its predominant taste, aroma, and
other characteristics ftom the given botanical vari-
ety of grape ftom which the name is derived. In
addition, varietal wines are required to be labeled
with an appellation of origin, and at least 75 per-
cent of the volume of the specified grape variety
must be obtained ftom that appellation (Seff &
Cooney, 1984: 437).
Mass production wineries—the generalist organi-
zational form in the wine industry—tend to pro-
duce generic wines such as burgundy, chablis,
claret, madeira, port, rhine, sherry, and tokay. Most
generic wines take their names from areas of
Europe. These generic wines, also known as jug
than one bonded premise or plant. The analysis in this
study was performed at the level of the firm, not the
bonded premise. Analyzing outcomes at the firm level
has distinct advantages since it is the level at which
decisions involving competitive strategy are made.
wines, are usually lower-priced than varietal
wines. In 1989, jug wines produced by California
wineries accounted for as much as 57 percent of the
volume of wine sales in the United States (Evenson,
1990). Unlike mass production wineries, farm win-
eries are typically founded with a distinct niche in
mind. Often they make small quantities of wine
ftom only one or two grape varieties. For example.
Laurel Cien Vineyard in Glen Ellen, California, pro-
duces only 5,000 cases of Cabernet Sauvignon
(StuUer & Martin, 1989).
Farm wineries lack the resources necessary for
mass-market advertising. Farm wineries reach con-
sumers through tasting rooms on winery premises
and word-of-mouth publicity generated by con-
sumers. Many use their winery as a marketing tool
by organizing receptions, weddings, and special
theme tastings (Fox, 1987). The fate of farm winer-
ies is determined to a great extent by the opinion of
wine critics. Wine critics are influential enough
that winemakers often create wines that agree with
the critics' palates (Unwin, 1991: 355).
Most farm wineries start small, in converted
basements, barns, and other buildings. Leasing pro-
duction equipment until sales stabilize at suffi-
ciently bigh levels minimizes initial capital out-
lays. Instead of acquiring sopbisticated technology,
farm wineries focus on discovering a winning com-
bination of climate, soil, and grape variety. Farm
wineries often cooperate with one another to re-
duce production and distribution costs and have
jointly petitioned the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms to recognize certain geographical ar-
eas as American Viticultural Areas (AVAs). This
designation allows wineries within an AVA to dis-
tinguish their products by labeling their wines with
the AVA as an appellation of origin.
Below, I develop several hypotheses that attempt
to explain the evolutionary patterns exhibited by
farm wineries, tbe specialist organizational form in
the U.S. wine industry. Though the hypotheses are
ftamed specifically with reference to the wine in-
dustry, they are broadly applicable to the evolution
of specialist organizations in mature industries.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Resource Partitioning: The Role of Location in
Resource Space
Carroll (1985) developed a location-based model
of resource partitioning to account for the mortality
rates of specialist firms in environments character-
ized by varying degrees of market concentration. As
tbe level of concentration in a market rises, the
death rate of generalist firms increases as they com-
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pete with each other to gain control over the center
of the market. Generalist organizations move to-
ward the center of the resource space, and their
failure rate increases as a result of crowding. The
surviving generalist firms that come to dominate
the market are fewer and larger. Economies of scale
in production and marketing imply that the best
location for a generalist firm is in the center of a
concentrated market. The degree of overlap in gen-
eralist firm strategies is high, since most of them try
to exploit resources available at the market center.
The total resource space covered by generalist firms
is smaller than it would be in a competitive, un-
concentrated market where firms offer differenti-
ated products or services. Therefore, in a concen-
trated market specialist firms have access to greater
resources located on the periphery of the resource
space. They can exploit peripheral market seg-
ments without directly competing with the larger
generalists.
Greater resource availability should improve the
survival chances of such specialist firms as a mar-
ket concentrates. It should also increase foundings
of specialist organizations (Freeman & Lomi, 1994;
Lomi, 1995). In an earlier study of farm winery
foundings in the U.S. wine industry (Swaminathan,
1995), I found support for the location-based re-
source-partitioning model but did not take into ac-
count additional explanations, such as the role of
an organizational form's identity characteristics, in
the resource-partitioning process. I address this is-
sue below.
Resource Partitioning: The Role of Specialist and
Generalist Identities
Tbe collective identity of organizations plays a
key role in tbe evolution of specialist organizations
within industries. Specialist organizations often try
to establish a collective identity that is distinct
ftom that of generalist organizations. Glemens ar-
gued that organizational form "appears as a move-
ment ftame which both informs collective identity
and orients groups toward other actors and institu-
tions" (1996: 205). Polos, Hannan, Garrofl, and Péli
(1998) used the method of logical formalism to
define an organizational form as a socially con-
structed collective identity of classes of organiza-
tions. Gommon sets of beliefs can lead entrepre-
neurs in emerging niches within industries to
undertake collective action that can help legitimate
a specialist organizational form.
The emergence of specialist organizations in in-
dustries such as brewing and wine making resem-
bles that of a social movement. The generation of a
collective identity is crucial to a movement's suc-
cess (Melucci, 1989). New social movements, such
as environmentalism and the women's movement,
have coalesced around collective identities rather
than around specific grievances or perceptions of
injustice. According to Melluci, a collective iden-
tity is generated via an interactive process in which
members construct a collective "we" through inter-
actions with nonmembers, countermovements, and
portrayals by the media. As a movement emerges,
boundaries are created that reinforce the "us-
versus-them" distinction (Taylor & Whittier, 1992).
A similar process occurs when new organizational
forms emerge. Romanelli (1989) suggested, for in-
stance, that as entrepreneurs in an emerging indus-
try interact by going to the same conferences and
trade shows and by seeking similar resources, op-
portunities arise for sbaring information and re-
sources. These interactions also isolate the new
organizational form ftom competitors and other ex-
ternal threats (Garud & Van de Ven, 1989).
The success with which emerging specialist or-
ganizations can respond to the threat of retaliation
ftom incumbent generalist organizations is closely
tied to the strength of their collective identity. This
identity can be so powerful tbat the generalists
cannot imitate the routines of the specialist organi-
zational form even when they have the resources
and technology to do so. For instance, mass pro-
duction firms in the brewing industry, sucb as An-
heuser-Busch, have the technical capabilities to
produce "microbrewed" beer. Their attempts to do
so, however, have met with very limited success
because such actions conflict with the collective
identity of microbrewers as defined by consumers.
More specifically, consumers buying specialty
beers seek a malt beverage brewed in a small, craft-
like firm according to traditional methods and us-
ing natural ingredients (Garroll & Swaminathan,
2000).
The success of microbreweries in preventing im-
itation by the mass producers is largely due to their
success in strategically deploying their identity.
Bernstein (1997) identified two identity deploy-
ment strategies. The "identity for critique" strategy
involves conftonting the identity and values of the
dominant culture. Microbreweries and "brewpubs"
emphasize differences between their beers and
those produced by mass production breweries.
In using the second identity deployment strategy,
"identity for education" (Bernstein, 1997), a move-
ment either challenges the dominant culture's per-
ception of itself or attempts to use its identity to
gain legitimacy by empbasizing noncontroversial
activities. For instance, although their efforts were
ultimately unsuccessful, in the 1860s brewers at-
tempted to align themselves with those advocating
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prohibition by professing that excessive use of hard
liquor was a terrible social problem. At the same
time, they differentiated beer ftom spirits and as-
serted that beer drinkers were upstanding members
of society (Baron, 1962).
An emerging specialist organizational form that
achieves some success may also provoke responses
ftom incumbent generalist organizations. For ex-
ample, such incumbents respond to competence-
destroying technological discontinuities by im-
proving the price-performance characteristics of
their current technology. Thus, telephone compa-
nies introduced digital subscriber lines in response
to the challenge posed by cable modems. Such a
process is consistent with the idea that intense
competition causes central players in an industry
to adopt value-adding rotitines ftom the periphery
(Leblebici et al., 1991). Thus, incumbents may try
to incorporate a new technology or approach that
gives the new population a competitive advantage.
Their success partially depends on whether the
new technology is competence-enhancing or com-
petence-destroying. Incumbents will have great dif-
ficulty incorporating competence-destroying tech-
nologies because these do not build on their
existing routines and skills (Tushman & Anderson,
1986). An incumbent generalist organization that is
able to assume a robust identity (Padgett & Ansell,
1993; Stark, 1996) by adding the identity character-
istics of the specialist organizational form to its
original identity will reduce the survival chances of
specialist organizations. The identity characteris-
tics of specialist and generalist organizations affect
the evolution of specialist organizations in the
wine industry in two ways. First, specialists that
can maintain claims to authenticity improve their
life chances. Second, the greater the extent to
which generalists can assume a robust identity, the
lower the founding rate, and the higher the mortal-
ity rate, of specialists.
Specialist identity: Maintaining authenticity.
Two important identity characteristics of a farm
winery are its size and its reputation for quality. As
a small winery on a vineyard, a farm winery draws
attention to the fact that wine is an agricultural
product like other foods. Most definitions of bou-
tique or chateau or farm wineries involve an indi-
cator of size. Industry norms suggest that a farm
winery is one that produces fewer than 50,000
cases of wine per year or has a storage capacity of
less than 100,000 gallons (Hiaring, 1976). These
size-based definitions are also reflected in laws
passed by several states to encourage the establish-
ment of farm wineries.
The wine industry is characterized by strong
economies of scale (Moulton, 1984). Economies of
scale are likely to operate if products are highly
standardized, as is the case with the goods of in-
cumbent mass producers in this industry. Wine
making is a capital-intensive process. Wineries
need to invest in stainless steel tanks and oak bar-
rels for fermentation, storage, and blending, in
computers for process control, and in forklifts,
trucks, bottling lines, and other equipment. Econo-
mies of scale exist both in winery construction and
operation. One estimate suggests that if the unit
production cost for each of 5,000 cases is 100, then
the unit cost for 100,000 cases would be 73; for
500,000 cases, 54; and for 3,000,000, 41 (Moulton,
1984).
Growth to a moderate size may be beneficial for
farm wineries—a larger operation may reap certain
economies of scale and thus lower its costs.
But growth beyond an optimal middle range may
bring farm wineries into direct competition with
younger, smaller mass producers that produce va-
rietal wines (see Amburgey, Dacin, and Kelly
[1994] for an account of similar effects of growth on
credit union mortality). Expansion beyond a cer-
tain size may also involve diseconomies of scale;
for example, equipment may have to be standard-
ized and an owner's labor may have to be replaced
by hired labor or capital equipment (Moulton,
1984: 396). Most importantly, excessive growth
may make it impossible for a farm winery to capi-
talize on its identity as being a local organization
with a distinctive character and a source of local
pride.
Farm wineries that own vineyards can appeal to
an even smaller niche by labeling their products as
estate-bottled. Estate-bottled wines are made en-
tirely ftom grapes that come ftom a vineyard owned
or controlled by a winery; in addition, the vineyard
and winery must both fall within the same AVA. By
the end of 1990, about 120 AVAs had been recog-
nized in the United States. Owing to the restrictive
labeling requirements, mass production wineries
rarely, if ever, produce estate-bottled wines. Farm
wineries that produce estate-bottled wines acquire
a marketing advantage, as consumers often at-
tribute superiority to such products (Priai, 1992).
Thus, farm wineries are typically small organiza-
tions, and vineyard ownership often conveys an
image of high quality. Farm wineries that violate
these two identity characteristics of their organiza-
tional form do so at their own peril.
Hypothesis la. Midsized farm wineries will ex-
perience lower mortality rates than other farm
wineries.
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Hypothesis lb. Farm wineries that own greater
amounts of vineyard land will experience
lower mortality rates than other farm wineries.
Generalist identity: Achieving robustness. The
location-based resource-partitioning model allows
taking a useful first cut at explaining the evolution
of specialist organizational forms. Two characteris-
tics of the model should be noted. First, segregating
processes that prevent specialist organizations
from making the transition to generalist, and vice
versa, are assumed to exist. Second, the model is
silent about the response of generalists to the
growth of the specialist segment. One possible re-
sponse of generalists would be to develop a robust
identity allowing them to operate in both the gen-
eralist and specialist segments.
The location-based resource-partitioning model
(Carroll, 1985) is an attempt to characterize pat-
terns of interdependence among organizations
within a population, an issue addressed earlier by
Hawley (1950), who developed a model with strik-
ingly different predictions. According to Hawley,
competition operates through selection processes,
which eliminate the weakest competitors. The res-
olution of competition is followed by functional
differentiation, as those who exit a market move
into adjacent niches. As Carroll (1985) noted. Haw-
ley's model is similar to the resource-partitioning
model in that they both lead to predictions of a shift
from competitive to symbiotic relations between
organizational forms. However, according to Haw-
ley's model, losers adapt through transformation,
whereas according to Carroll's model, losers die
and are replaced by new kinds of organizations.
From Hawley's model, one would expect firms that
exit the mass producer market to move into the
peripheral markets populated by specialist organi-
zational forms. In Carroll's resource-partitioning
model, however, exits from the mass producer mar-
ket coincide with the death of such firms.
In the wine industry, the evidence does not sup-
port Hawley's adaptationist argument. There is no
record of a transition from generalist mass producer
to specialist farm winery. Mass producers typically
exit the industry by failing or, in some cases, being
acquired by another mass producer. In addition,
laws in several states restrict farm wineries to a
certain production capacity, thus preventing mass
producers from making a transition to the specialist
form. Specialist organizations such as farm winer-
ies are usually newly founded organizations, al-
though there are a few cases of entry through ac-
quisition by firms or individuals from outside the
industry.
With the passage of time, however, blending may
blur the boundaries between the specialist and gen-
eralist organizational forms. Ceneralists are often
the spawning grounds for entrepreneurs who go on
to found specialists (Brittain & Freeman, 1980;
Freeman, 1986). Founders leave the imprint of their
previous labor market experience on the strategies
of new organizations (Boeker, 1988). Boundaries
between generalist and specialist forms may also
erode through a process of "random drift" (Hannan
& Freeman, 1989: 58), the cumulative impact of
unintended changes in organizational routines.
Random drift can also result from knowledge trans-
mitted from one organization to another as individ-
uals pursue career paths that intersect organiza-
tions with generalist and specialist forms.
Without the presence of strong segregating pro-
cesses, generalists may be able to adapt to changing
environmental conditions by copying routines
from specialists through "mimetic isomorphism"
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Generalist wineries
have at least two strategies available for creating a
robust identity that will allow them to operate in
both the generalist and specialist segments. First,
they can respond to the growth of specialist seg-
ments by offering a wider variety of products, in-
cluding some that resemble the products offered by
specialists (Chamberlin, 1933; Scherer, 1980: 384-
402). Bain (1956) concluded that product differen-
tiation is as important as economies of large-scale
production and distribution in providing market
incumbents with a cost advantage over new en-
trants. Several mass producer wineries, including
industry leader E&J Gallo, now count high-quality
varietal wines among their products. One indicator
of product differentiation is the number of brands
produced by mass producers. Pioneering brands
tend to have long-term advantages when consum-
ers have imperfect information about product
quality (Bain, 1956; Schmalensee, 1978, 1982;
Scherer, 1980: 258-260). The greater the average
number of brands available in the market, the more
difficult it is for a new brand to establish itself.
Therefore, brand proliferation among mass produc-
ers will likely help them achieve a robust identity
and depress the growth of the specialist farm
winery population.
Hypothesis 2a. The greater the average number
of brands per mass producer winery, the lower
the founding rate of farm wineries.
Hypothesis 2b. The greater the average number
of brands per mass producer winery, the higher
the mortality rate of farm wineries.
Second, a generalist winery can achieve a robust
identity by increasing advertising spending to ere-
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ate an image of quality. Sales response to advertis-
ing expenditure is typically assumed to take the
shape of a logistic curve (Ackoff & Emshoff, 1975;
Brown, 1978; Comanor & Wilson, 1974). Larger
firms' advertising may generate a curve represent-
ing a more favorable response because of consumer
inertia. Economies of scale in promotion and ad-
vertising may allow major firms to charge higher
prices for premium products. Firms that operate
nationally benefit more since none of their adver-
tising is wasted in terms of media utilization. Also,
they are less affected by migration of consumers
ftom one part of the country to another.
Hypothesis 3a. The greater the average adver-
tising intensity of mass producer wineries, the
lower the founding rate of farm wineries.
Hypothesis 3b. The greater the average adver-
tising intensity of mass producer wineries, the
higher the mortality rate of farm wineries.
Attempts at brand proliferation, or increasing ad-
vertising spending, however, are determined to a
large extent by the strategic decisions of mass pro-
ducers and can be viewed as endogenous sunk
costs. Mass producers can introduce brands to fill
all niches and escalate advertising expenditures in
ways that deter entry into and encourage exit ftom
the specialist or ftinge segment of an industry (see,
for example, the analysis of the ready-to-eat break-
fast cereal industry by Sutton [1991: 227-247]).
I examined the effects of location and identity-
based resource partitioning on the founding and
mortality rates of farm wineries in the context of
baseline models. These baseline models incorpo-
rated the effects of local and extralocal density
dependence, niche formation as captured by the
level of wine imports, and heterogeneity in state-
level niche structure as determined by per capita
personal income, per capita wine consumption,
population living in dry areas, and the existence of
farm winery laws. The baseline mortality model
also included organizational characteristics such as
size, vineyard ownership, product type, and mode
of entry. Hypotheses relating the evolution of farm
wineries to the process of resource partitioning
were tested with event count and event history data
ftom the American wine industry over the period
1941-90.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Models and Methods
In the analysis reported below, I tried to identify
factors that influenced the evolution of the farm
winery organizational form in the wine industry in
post-Prohibition America. In modeling the found-
ing and mortality rates of farm wineries, I used
event count models for founding rates and event
history analysis for mortality rates. Though farm
wineries were theoretically "at risk" of emerging
since the repeal of Prohibition in 1933, data avail-
ability restricted the period of analysis to 1941-90.
In modeling the organizational founding process,
I treated the population as the unit of analysis and
analyzed an annual time series of the numbers of
state-level farm winery foundings. Barron (1992)
described generalized quasi-likelihood estimation
procedures to model event counts that are autocor-
related. This method, however, can only be applied
to a single time series of event counts. Because my
data contain multiple time series of farm winery
foundings clustered by state, using this method
would have produced errors in the correction for
autocorrelation. In this study, I followed Guo
(1996), who used a random effects model to esti-
mate counts of a medical procedure performed in
175 hospitals in each quarter between 1988 and
1991. In Guo's (1996) study, the quarterly observa-
tions contributed by a hospital were unlikely to be
independent. But, conditional on a hospital-
specific random effect, the quarterly counts ftom
the same hospital could be treated as independent.
In my study, I had counts of farm winery foundings
in 51 clusters (50 states and the District of Colum-
bia). A random-effects model for such clustered
count data is given by
= T¡¡ (1)
where ö, is a state-specific random effect, jLt,y (Ö,) is
the mean count for observation / in state i, and T¡j is
exposure for observation; in state i. In my analysis,
T¡j is set to 1, that is, I assume that all states have
equal exposure. The assumption underlying this
model is that the count random variables in the ñh
state are mutually independent, given a state-
specific random effect 0,. A negative multinomial
regression model can be obtained by assuming that
the random effect Q¡ in Equation 1 has a gamma
distribution with density/(e,) = 0,*"^ exp(-(i)0,)<^*/
), so that the mean equals 1 and the variance is
For the mortality analyses, I used the individual
organization as the unit of analysis and estimated a
firm-specific instantaneous mortality rate that is
age-dependent. The choice of a specific parametric
model of age dependence in farm winery mortality
rates was based on the results of exploratory non-
parametric analysis (SAS Institute, 1989; Wu,
1990). This analysis revealed that the extended log-
logistic model provided the best fit for the farm
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winery data (Brüderl & Diekmann, 1995). Follow-
ing Blossfeld and Rohwer (1995: 184-185), I spec-
ified this model as foflows: r(t) = cèfoi/"V(l -t-
at)'^, where a is exp [Aa], b is exp {Bß}, and c is IC7I.
In this model, it is assumed that the first term of the
covariate vectors A, B, and C is a constant equal to
1. The coefficients a, ß, and y are the model param-
eters to be estimated. I assumed that the effect of
the covariates was independent of age t and in-
cluded them in C. Therefore, the model I estimated
is given by r¡[t\x¡Jt)] = cb(at)''~^/[l + atf, where a
is exp iaol, b is exp |ßo}, and c is [yg + y„ x¡Jt)], a^
and J3Q are the parameter estimates for the constants
in the A and B vectors, 70 is the parameter estimate
for the constant in the C vector, y^ is a vector of
parameter estimates for the covariate vector x¡Jt),
and Í is the age of the organization. Again, r¡[t\x¡Jt)]
is the organization-specific mortality rate given by'
a vector of covariates, x¡Jt), for organization J. In
the above model, if ßo is greater than 0, it implies
that the organizational mortality rate increases to a
peak and then declines with age i. This specifica-
tion of age dependence is consistent with some
previous research that has shown nonmonotonic
age dependence in organizational mortality rates
(Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990). The vector of covari-
ates, Xjjt), exerts a log-linear effect on the organi-
zational mortality rate. As is conventional, I used
the chi-square likelihood ratio statistic to test the
overall fit of a specific model with a given number
of constraints to that of a nested model of the same
functional form with fewer constraints.
The relative fit of models can be determined by
computing the likelihood ratio test stafisfic, which is
defined as ju, = max Lg/max L ,^ where LQ and Lj
denote the respective likelihoods of the null model
(subject to, say, n constraints) and the alternative
model that relaxes the constraints respectively. With
large samples, —2ln ¡x is distributed as a chi-square
with n degrees of fteedom. I report the negative of the
log likelihood for the founding and mortality models
in my tables. Therefore, two times the difterence of
the negafive log likelihoods of a pair of hierarchically
nested models in the tables has approximately a chi-
square distribution under the null hypothesis.
I used a maximum likelihood estimation program
written by Guo (1996) along witb the numerical
optimization package GQOPT (Quandt, 1997) to
estimate negative multinomial models of state-level
farm winery foundings. To estimate the extended
log-logistic mortality rate models, I used Version
5.7 of the statistical package TDA (Rohwer, 1994).^
Data
Annual directories of wineries compiled by
Wines &• Vines constitute the primary source of
event history data on the population of winemak-
ing firms. My data include information on all
American wine producers. The entries in the
Mues &• Vines directories identify each bonded
premise, company names and addresses, bonded
winery or wine cellar license numbers, current
owners or managers, sizes in terms of storage
capacity, vineyards owned, and products and
brand names. Because the listings in the annual
directories relate to plants (individual bonded
premises) rather than to firms, I aggregated the
histories for all plants belonging to the same firm.
That is, my data record firm-level event histories
on foundings and deaths. The founding year was
assumed to be the year in which a wine-making
firm first appeared in the directory. Since the
directories were available from 1940 onward, I
could accurately identify founding years for win-
eries founded in the period covered by this study.
Wineries were assumed to have died in the first
year in which they failed to appear in the direc-
tory or in the first year in which they were listed
as under new ownership. I assumed changes in
ownership if addresses and bonded winery li-
cense numbers of wineries remained the same
while owner names changed. I examined indus-
try news columns in monthly issues of Wines &•
Vines over the entire period of observation to
corroborate the data on winery foundings, disso-
lutions, and acquisitions. I further cross-vali-
dated the event history data by examining annual
records provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, and Firearms.
Industry data were obtained ftom the Wines &
Vines Annual Statistical Survey and Jobson's Wine
Marketing Handbook. Firm-level data were ob-
tained from the Wines &- Vines Yearbook of the
Wine Industry, Wines &' Vines Wineries of North
America and Vineyard Industry Suppliers, Wines &•
Vines Directory of the Wine Industry, and The New
Connoisseur's Handbook of California Wine (Roby
& Olken, 1991). For the mortality analyses, each
organization's life history was broken up into an-
nual spells, witb all but the last spell being cen-
sored on the right. Wineries that survived into 1991
were also treated as right-censored. To correct for
time aggregation bias, I adopted tbe procedure sug-
^ Data on farm wineries that were alive at the end of
1990 were "right-censored" (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995:
34-35). TDA 5.7 accommodates such data. The data on
farm wineries are not "left-censored," since I considered
only those wineries founded in the period 1941-90.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis of Farm Winery Founding Rates"
Variable Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum
Number of farm winery foundings by state
State per capita annual personal income''
State per capita annual wine consumption"^
Percentage of state population in dry areas
State farm winery law"*
Density of farm wineries in state
Density of mass production wineries in state
Volume of wine imports"
Industry concentration'
Scale of mass production wineries^
Brand proliferation among mass production wineries'"
Advertising intensity among mass production wineries'
0.678
9.777
1.146
6.176
0.103
8.430
4.711
40.991
0.0008
3.166
2.503
0.335
3.156
3.630
0.988
12.597
0.305
32.710
22.271
42.957
3.694
1.865
0.323
0.105
0.000
1.767
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.003
-8.537
0.779
1.872
0.123
58.000
22.459
7.033
63.112
1.000
484.000
206.000
142.411
6.403
6.626
3.176
0.560
° n = 2,524 for all variables.
*" Thousands of constant 1987 dollars.
° Calions.
•^  1 = "yes," 0 = "no."
" Millions of gallons.
' Residual of regression of scale, brand proliferation, and advertising intensity variables on the four-firm ratio.
^ Average capacity in millions of gallons.
*" Average number of brands.
' Advertising costs per gallon in constant 1987 dollars/gallon sold.
gested by Petersen (1991): for organizations that did
not survive, I assumed that the mortality event
occurred at the midpoint of the last annual spell.
To deal with time-varying covariates, I updated
their values at the beginning of each year for each
organization (Hannan & Freeman, 1989: 187; Tuma
& Hannan, 1984).
Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics on
tbe variables used in the founding and mortality
rate analyses, respectively. As noted above, I as-
sumed farm wineries to be at risk of being founded
after the repeal of Prohibition in 1933. However,
since information for several variables was only
available ftom 1940 onward and all independent
variables were lagged by one year to ensure exoge-
neity with respect to the dependent variable in
question, I could analyze farm winery founding
and failure rates only for the years 1941-90. A total
of 1,711 farm wineries were founded during the
period. The data for the analysis of founding rates
were organized as an annual time series for the
years ftom 1941 through 1990 for all variables. The
data for the analysis of organizational mortality
rates were organized in firm-year spells. To be con-
sistent, I only considered farm wineries founded in
or after 1941 in the mortality analysis. Using such a
procedure, the total number of firm-year spells
generated by tbe 1,711 farm wineries is 14,205.
However, missing firm-level data on some of the
independent variables resulted in 11,987 usable
firm-year spells on 1,389 firms for the mortality
analysis.^
RESULTS
Table 3 presents negative multinomial models of
tbe state-level founding rates of farm wineries.
Model 1 represents a baseline model that takes into
account the effects of niche characteristics on
founding rates. States with higher per capita in-
comes and wine consumption levels experienced a
higher rate of farm winery foundings. The results
also suggest substantial variation across states in
the social acceptability of farm wineries: tbe farm
winery founding rate is lower in states that have
greater proportions of their populations living in
dry areas. Institutional support in the form of farm
winery laws increases the founding rate of farm
wineries. Model 2 takes into account density de-
pendence in founding rates. State-level farm win-
ery density has a significant, nonmonotonic effect
on the founding rate of farm wineries, thereby sup-
^ Delacroix, Swaminathan, and Solt (1989) employed a
time trend variable to capture the effects of unobserved
variations in a selection environment over time. The
inclusion of such a variable in both the founding and
mortality models reported below did not alter the results
appreciably. Moreover, the time trend variable itself did
not significantly affect either vital rate.
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis of Farm Winery Mortality Rates"
Variable Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum
State per capita annual personal income''
State per capita annual wine consumption'^
Percentage of state population in dry areas
State farm winery law''
Organizational size"
Acres of vineyard owned
Number of brands
Table wine producer''
Dessert wine producer''
Fruit wine producer''
Sparkling wine producer''
Vermouth producer''
Brandy producer''
Entry through acquisition''
Density of farm wineries in state
Density of farm wineries in state at founding
Density of mass production wineries in state
Total capacity of farm wineries*^
Volume of wine imports'
Industry concentration^
Scale of mass production wineries''
Brand proliferation among mass production wineries'
Advertising intensity among mass production wineries'
14.964
2.919
2.239
0.234
9.548
29.630
1.339
0.951
0.140
0.158
0.134
0.022
0.009
0.079
177.830
119.231
69.704
16.682
86.782
-1.154
5.280
2.491
0.395
3.083
1.359
6.459
0.423
1.212
51.68
1.026
0.215
0.347
0.365
0.341
0.147
0.094
0.269
187.542
135.426
69.443
8.366
38.687
3.625
1.436
0.221
0.096
3.600
0.056
0.000
0.000
5.165
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.000
3.346
2.267
-8.551
1.045
1.909
0.175
22.459
4.810
52.276
1.000
12.429
750.000
12.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
493.000
493.000
206.000
28.414
142.411
6.376
6.626
3.176
0.533
" Í1 = 11,987 for all variables.
'' Thousands of constant 1987 dollars.
° Calions.
'' 1 = "yes," 0 = "no."
" Calions of installed capacity; logarithm.
' Millions of gallons.
^ Residual of regression of scale, brand proliferation, and advertising intensity variables on the four-firm ratio.
'' Average capacity in millions of gallons.
' Average number of brands.
' Advertising costs per gallon in constant 1987 dollars/gallon sold.
porting Hannan's (1986) model of density-depen-
dent evolution.'' In addition, state-level mass pro-
duction winery density had a negative effect on the
farm winery founding rate, implying local compet-
itive interaction between the two organizational
forms.
Model 3 presents the effects of location-based
resource partitioning in addition to those of density
and niche characteristics on the founding rate of
farm wineries. Industry concentration, the indica-
tor used to denote location-based resource parti-
tioning, is positively correlated with the variables
measuring scale, brand proliferation, and advertis-
ing intensity among mass production wineries. The
basic idea in using industry concentration as a
proxy for resource partitioning in previous studies
"* In models not reported here, out-of-state farm winery
density and population mass measured by the total ca-
pacity of farm wineries had nonsignificant effects on the
state-level founding rate of farm wineries.
(Carroll, 1985; Lomi, 1995; Swaminathan, 1995) is
that greater firm-level homogeneity is expected at
higher levels of concentration. In keeping with this
idea, I constructed the resource-partitioning vari-
able by calculating the residuals ftom a regression
of the variables measuring scale, brand prolifera-
tion, and advertising intensity among mass produc-
tion wineries on the four-firm concentration ratio.
In other words, the resource-partitioning variable
named "industry concentration" in the tables picks
up the variation in the four-firm concentration ratio
that cannot be attributed to these three variables.
Presumably, use of this variable captures the ho-
mogenization of firms that occurs as industries be-
come more concentrated. In model 3, the location-
based resource-partitioning variable has a positive
and significant effect on the founding rate. Model 3
shows that the founding rate of farm wineries in-
creases with the average scale of mass production
wineries. Scale economies in production, distribu-
tion, and R&D may act as mobility barriers, depress-
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TABLE 3
Negative Multinomial Regression Models of Farm Winery Foundings
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant
State per capita annual personal income''
State per capita annual wine consumption*^
Percentage of state population in dry areas
State farm winery law"*
Density of farm wineries in state
Density of farm wineries in state squared/1,000
Density of mass production wineries in state
Volume of wine imports"
Industry concentration*^
Scale of mass production wineries^
Brand proliferation among mass production wineries''
Advertising intensity among mass production wineries'
-Log likelibood
Number of state-year spells
Number of founding events
-2.0506** (,2760)
0,0775** (,0184)
0.6362** (,0625)
-0,0570** (,0078)
0.5396** (,1031)
0,4075** (.0769)
-574,75
2,524,00
1,711.00
-2.4864**
0,1254**
0.3084**
-0,0477**
0,3525**
0,0171**
-0.0306**
-0.0068**
0.5129**
-652,44
2.
1
,524.00
,711.00
(.2755)
(.0194)
(.0678)
(,0076)
(,1100)
(,0014)
(,0023)
(.0022)
(.1010)
-1.3154^
-0.0770+
0,3195**
-0.0524**
0.3051**
0,0141**
-0.0250**
-0.0069**
-0.0066**
2.2146**
0.4722**
-1.4873**
-4.0710**
0.4901**
-713.07
2,524.00
1,711.00
(.7395)
(.0393)
(.0764)
(,0079)
(.1125)
(.0016)
(,0027)
(.0020)
(.0015)
(.7403)
(.0736)
(.1423)
(.3527)
(.0971)
" Standard errors are in parentbeses.
'' Tbousands of constant 1987 dollars.
•= Gallons.
•^  1 = "yes," 0 = "no,"
" Millions of gallons,
' Residual of regression of scale, brand proliferation, and advertising intensity variables on tbe four-firm ratio,
^ Average capacity in millions of gallons,
^ Average number of brands.
' Advertising costs per gallon in constant 1987 dollars/gallon sold.
' Estimate of the variance of tbe gamma-distributed cluster-specific random effect in tbe negative multinomial model,
•'^  p < ,10
** p < .01
ing entries into the mass production segment and
encouraging entries into peripheral segments of the
industry. The impact of brand proliferation and
advertising intensity on the farm winery founding
rate is consistent with the predictions of Hypothe-
ses 2a and 3a, respectively. Increasing brand pro-
liferation and advertising intensity among mass
production wineries has a negative effect on farm
winery foundings. These results suggest that mass
producers may be able to discourage the prolifera-
tion of farm wineries by introducing brands for
niche markets and by creating an image of high
quality for their own products through aggressive
advertising and thus assuming a robust identity.
Taken together, the models in Table 3 provide
strong evidence in favor of both location and iden-
tity-based resource-partitioning processes in the
wine industry.
Table 4 presents estimates from extended log-
logistic models of farm winery mortality rates.
Model 1 in Table 4 is a baseline model that takes
into account differences in niche characteristics
across states. Wineries located in states with greater
per capita incomes experience lower mortality
rates. Note also that the estimate of ßo is greater
than 0, implying that farm wineries exhibit a strong
"liability of adolescence" in their mortality rates.
The estimate of ßg in model 1 suggests that farm
winery mortality first increases and then declines
with age, with the maximum mortality rate reached
at an age often years. Model 2 in Table 4 examines
the effects of organizational characteristics on farm
winery mortality rates. These characteristics in-
clude the size of each winery (measured as the
natural logarithm of its capacity), the number of
brands produced by each winery, and whether a
winery produces one or more of several products.
Two important identity characteristics of this spe-
cialist organizational form are size and acres of
vineyard owned. Hypothesis la receives strong
support. I found evidence of nonmonotonic size
dependence in the farm winery mortality rate—
midsized farm wineries experienced significantly
lower mortality. The death rate of specialist organ-
izations may decline with size until a particular
point, after which it increases with size. This pat-
tern of mortality is consistent with the possibility
that at the boundary, the identity of the largest
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TABLE 4
Log-Logistic Hazard Rate Models of Farm Winery
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
-2.1756** (.1622) -2.1056** (.1411) -2.1275** (.1446) -2.2258** (.1568) -2.2300** (.1714)
0.8644** (.0815) 0.9179** (.0783) 0.9100** (.0783) 0.8994** (.0766) 0.8940** (.0795)
-1.9705** (.2590) 6.2375** (1.9827) 6.1182** (1.9898) 6.1670** (1.9854) 7.4951** (2.1608)
-0.0786** (.0260) -0.0445 (.0275) -0.0407 (.0271) -0.0712* (.0334) -0.0440 (.0441)State per capita annual personal
income''
State per capita annual wine
consumption'^
Percentage of state population in
dry areas
State farm winery law''
Organizational size"
Organizational size squared
Acres of vineyard ownership
Number of brands
Table wine producer''
Dessert wine producer''
Fruit wine producer''
Sparkling wine producer''
Vermouth producer'^
Brandy producer''
Entry through acquisition"
Density of farm wineries in state
Density of farm wineries squared/
1,000
Density of farm wineries in state at
founding
Density of mass production
wineries in state
Total capacity of farm wineries'
Volume of wine imports^
Industry concentration^
Scale of mass production wineries'^
Brand proliferation among mass
production wineries'
Advertising intensity among mass
production wineries'
0.0053 (.0708) 0.0198 (.0742) -0.0041 (.0718) 0.1328 (.1006) 0.2122* (.1069)
0.0067 (.0065) 0.0104 (.0067) 0.0092 (.0066) 0.0130^ (.0068) 0.0158* (.0070)
0.2341 (.1504) 0.2863'^
-1.7426**
0.0867**
-0.0042**
0.0639
-0.2364
-0.0495
0.0697
-0.4278*
0.6511*
-0.4535
0.6040**
(.1558)
(.4421)
(.0240)
(.0016)
(.0449)
(.2187)
(.1472)
(.1377)
(.1763)
(.2995)
(.4906)
(.1584)
0.2597"^
-1.7403**
0.0867**
-0.0043**
-0.4159*
0.6408*
0.5690**
(.1533)
(.4404)
(.0239)
(.0016)
(.1770)
(.2786)
(.1548)
0.2179
-1.7884**
0.0891**
-0.0043**
-0.4354*
0.6209*
0.5312**
-0.0063*
0.0059
0.0022*
0.0041^
0.0287**
(.1644)
(.4411)
(.0239)
(.0016)
(.1758)
(.2764)
(.1614)
(.0030)
(.0050)
(.0009)
(.0021)
(.0099)
0.3576* (.1767)
-1.7204** (.4417)
0.0858** (.0239)
-0.0045** (.0016)
-0.4617** (.1768)
0.5228'^  (.2830)
0.4958** (.1622)
-0.0062* (.0031)
0.0064 (.0052)
0.0019* (.0009)
0.0029 (.0022)
-0.0142 (.0171)
-0.0222** (.0043)
-0.0426* (.0193)
0.4227** (.1444)
-1.0303** (.3810)
1.5781^ (.8424)
-Log likelihood
Degrees of freedom
Number of firm-year spells
Number of mortality events
1,710.79
7
11,987
416
1,681.38
18
11,987
416
1,683.81
13
11,987
416
1,673.71
18
11,987
416
1,657.35
23
11,987
416
" Standard errors are in parentheses, a,,, ßg, and -yo ^ 6 parameter estimates for the constant terms in the A, B, and C covariate vectors
of the extended log-logistic model, respectively.
'' Thousands of constant 1987 dollars.
" Gallons.
'' 1 = "yes," 0 = "no."
" Gallons of installed capacity; logarithm.
' Millions of gallons.
^ Residual of regression of scale, brand proliferation, and advertising intensity variables on the four-firm ratio.
^ Average capacity in millions of gallons.
' Average number of brands.
' Advertising costs per gallon in constant 1987 dollars/gallon sold.
^ p < .10
* p < .05
** p < .01
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among the specialist organizations gets blurred and
fades into that of the generalist mass producers.^
Consistent with Hypothesis lb, the mortality rate is
significantly lower for farm wineries that own
greater vineyard acreage. Vineyard ownership al-
lows farm wineries to exercise greater control over
the quality of wine grapes and also to label their
wines as estate-bottled and perhaps convey an im-
age of higher product quality.
In addition, it appears that farm wineries produc-
ing sparkling wines have lower mortality rates and
that those producing vermouth have higher mortal-
ity rates when compared to wineries that do not
produce either of these products. Farm wineries
that enter the wine industry through acquisition are
more likely to fail than those that are founded as
new organizations. This result is consistent with
two explanations. First, organizations that are
founded through acquisition are speculative and
cannot survive in the long term. And second, such
organizations are often headed by owners or man-
agers who lack the industry experience that is cru-
cial to the survival of specialist organizational
forms such as farm wineries.
Model 3 in Table 4, tbe best-fitting model, in-
cludes the effects of key identity characteristics of
the farm winery organizational form, such as size
and ownership of vineyard land. In model 3 and
the more complete model 5, the mortality rates
seem to be influenced strongly by tbe level of in-
stitutional support for the organizational form.
State laws designed to encourage farm wineries do
increase foundings, but they also increase failures.
These results suggest that incentives formulated to
encourage the entry of specialist firms may lead to
a level of entry that is higher than the carrying
capacity of the niche, thus increasing the mortality
rate among such entrants.
Model 4 in Table 4 examines density and mass
dependence in farm winery mortality rates. State-
level farm winery density had a nonmonotonic ef-
fect on the mortality rate, as implied by Hannan's
(1986) model. However, the second-order effect
was not significant, suggesting that legitimation
dominates among farm wineries within each state.
Carroll and Hannan's (1989) extension of the den-
sity model receives strong support—farm winery
^ This result is consistent with size-localized models
of competition. Since the smallest mass producers and
the largest of the specialist organizations would fall in
the middle of the size distribution for the entire popula-
tion, they are likely to have higher death rates (Baum &
Mezias, 1992; Hannan, Ranger-Moore, & Banaszak-Holl,
1990; Wholey, Christianson, & Sanchez, 1992).
density at founding has a significant, positive effect
on the mortality rate. Farm wineries founded when
the density within a state is high suffer higher
mortality rates at all ages than those founded in
low-density periods. State-level mass production
winery density increased the farm winery mortality
rate, though the effect was significant only at the
.10 level. Models not reported here showed no im-
pact of the density of farm wineries outside a state.
These results suggest that both competition and
legitimation occur primarily at the state level. Pop-
ulation mass, measured by the total capacity of
farm wineries, has a positive effect on the mortality
rate, suggesting that larger firms generate more
competition (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990).
Model 5 in Table 4 present the effects of niche
formation, location-based resource partitioning,
and generalist identity on the mortality rate of farm
wineries. Delacroix and Solt's (1988) indicator of
niche formation, the level of wine imports, has a
negative effect. Consistent with previous findings,
industry concentration, the measure of location-
based resource partitioning, also has a negative ef-
fect on the mortality rate of farm wineries. Scale
economies among mass production wineries in-
crease the farm winery mortality rate. It is possible
that this variable represents two underlying effects.
Tbe greater size of mass production wineries en-
courages new entrants to choose the farm winery
segment. But the larger mass producers can also
diminish the survival chances of farm wineries
through the control of key complementary assets
such as distribution channels. Greater brand prolif-
eration among mass producers reduces tbe farm
winery mortality rate, contrary to tbe prediction of
Hypothesis 2b. Higher advertising intensity among
mass production wineries increases farm winery
mortality, supporting Hypothesis 3b. Combined
with the earlier finding that greater advertising in-
tensity suppressed farm winery foundings, this re-
sult strongly supports the argument that mass pro-
ducers can have a competitive impact on the farm
winery subpopulation through mass advertising. In
other words, mass production wineries use higher
advertising outlays to create robust identities that
allow them to compete effectively in both the gen-
eralist and specialist segments of the U.S. wine
industry.
DISCUSSION
Farm wineries are instances of organizations
with a specialist form operating in a mature indus-
try. The resource-partitioning model suggests that
the high concentration that is often a feature of
industry maturity has different implications for the
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performance of specialist and generalist organiza-
tions. The results obtained in this study suggest
that useful insights into industry evolution can be
obtained by dividing mature industries (or organi-
zational populations) into two strategic groups (or
organizational subpopulations): generalists and
specialists. In an attempt to redefine empirical re-
search on strategic groups, Carroll and Swami-
nathan (1992) suggested two promising directions
for future investigation. First, they advocated the
use of the concept of organizational form to define
strategic groups within an industry (see Barnett,
1993). Second, they proposed using nonaccounting
measures, such as organizational founding and
mortality rates, outcomes that are determined by
membership in and interdependence between stra-
tegic groups in an industry. This study extended
the findings of Carroll and Swaminathan to the
study of organizational change in a mature indus-
try. Its results confirm a strong effect of location-
based resource partitioning on increasing the
founding rate and decreasing the mortality rate of
specialist organizations—farm wineries—in the
American wine industry.
In addition, this study shows that identity char-
acteristics of specialist and generalist organiza-
tional forms play an important role in the evolution
of specialist organizational forms (see also Carroll
and Swaminathan [2000] on specialist organiza-
tions in the brewing industry). Two important
identity characteristics of farm wineries are their
smallness and their reputation for high quality tied
to vineyard ownership. Farm wineries that devi-
ated ftom the identity characteristics of their organ-
izational form suffered poor performance. Large
farm wineries experienced much higher mortality
rates than midsized ones. Farm wineries often
launch ambitious growth programs funded by bank
debt. Prominent failures, such as that of the wine
management group Vintech of Santa Rosa, Califor-
nia, have drawn attention to the sensitivity of an
aggressive growth strategy to industry downturns
(Berger, 1991; Priai, 1991). Farm wineries that own
larger vineyards suffer less mortality, possibly re-
flecting their greater control over the quality of raw
materials. Vineyard ownership also ties up the
best-quality grapes and thus disadvantages other
farm wineries that do not own vineyards and de-
pend upon such supplies.
Perhaps the most interesting set of results in-
volves generalist responses to the growth of the
specialist segment. The results suggest that mass
producers that adopt a robust identity through
brand proliferation coupled with higher advertis-
ing expenditures succeed in breaching the bound-
aries between the generalist and specialist sub-
populations. Greater advertising intensity among
mass producers is found in conjunction with a
lower founding rate and a higher mortality rate
among farm wineries. These results suggest the
possibility that mass producers may adversely af-
fect the fortunes of the farm winery subpopulation
by creating a superior image for their own products
through heavy .advertising, an image that may offset
the quality image cultivated by farm wineries. This
trend can be witnessed in the growth of mass pro-
ducers who produce "value" wines. Kendall-Jack-
son Vineyards of Santa Rosa, Galifornia, is a good
example of a value vintner; by offering products
such as a sweet Ghardonnay for $9 a bottle, it has
become tbe fastest-growing mass producer over tbe
last decade (Fisher, 1992). Other "value" mass pro-
ducers include firms such as Glos du Bois, Fetzer,
Beringer, and Stimson Lane Wine and Spirits, with
its Golumbia Grest label. Most of these firms sell
wine at $7 to $10 a bottle of a quality that might
otherwise cost the consumer $12 to $16 a bottle.
Though the research described above adds to un-
derstanding of the evolution of strategic groups or
subpopulations composed of specialist organiza-
tions, much work remains to be done. Two separate
lines of inquiry appear to be promising for extend-
ing tbis researcb. Tbe pattern of results for the
impact of identity characteristics of the generalist
organizational form on the founding and mortality
rate of specialists suggests that researchers need to
pay more attention to the forces that cause more or
less overlap between these two segments of an in-
dustry. In models of niche overlap in ecological
research, niches or resource spaces are typically
treated as n-dimensional rectangles in multidimen-
sional space (e.g., Baum & Singh, 1994a, 1994b;
McPherson, 1983). Péli and Nooteboom (1999) re-
conceptualized niches as n-dimensional spheres,
derived the basic predictions of the resource-parti-
tioning model, and further explained why general-
ists do not expand to occupy the entire resource
space available to a population. Empirically, rather
than resort to using measures of generalist segment
structure to infer generalist firm behavior, it would
be more useful to model the impact of generalist
firm actions that may lead to different degrees of
overlap along multiple dimensions with firms in
the specialist segment. One could then distinguish
between the impact of scale economies that might
be exogenously determined by technological
change and the impact of generalist firm strategies,
such as brand proliferation and intensive advertis-
ing, that are endogenous to an industry (Boone &
Witteloostuijn, 1995). In other words, researchers
need to develop an understanding of the resource-
partitioning process by examining the actual be-
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havior of generalist and specialist firms (see, for
example, Seidel's [1997] analysis of the U.S. airline
industry). For instance, farm wineries have re-
sponded in different ways to competition ftom
mass producers of "value" wines. Some farm win-
eries have adopted identity characteristics that are
more typical of the mass producers by emphasizing
distribution and advertising (Akst, 1991; Anderson,
1990). An example of such change was Winter-
brook Vineyard's decision to spend $500,000, or as
much as 11 percent of its projected 1991 sales rev-
enues, on advertising and promotion, making it one
of the largest advertisers among California farm
wineries (Graebner, 1991). Other farm wineries
have moved in the opposite direction and tried to
redefine the identity of the farm winery organiza-
tional form more narrowly by focusing on wine
ftom a single grape variety rather than two or three.
For instance, both the B.R. Cohn Winery in Glen
Ellen, California, and the Chimney Rock Winery in
Napa, California, decided to specialize in cabernet
sauvignon and reduced their output of chardonnay
to minimal levels (Berger, 1992). The success of
these alternative approaches to competing in the
wine industry depends on whether wineries can
maintain robust identities that allow them to com-
pete in both the generalist and specialist segments.
Second, future research could also examine the
role of communal support structures in the evolu-
tion of specialist organizations. Piore and Sabel
(1984: 265-266) argued that various forms of insti-
tutional cooperation helped in the growth of spe-
cialized industrial districts such as those in the
textile and clothing industry in Italy and the United
States (Lazerson, 1988; Uzzi, 1996). Some institu-
tions, such as trade associations, guilds, and
unions, serve a sociopolitical purpose, providing a
collective voice for specialist firms within an in-
dustry. Others, such as purchasing and marketing
cooperatives, fulfill an economic rationale. By us-
ing other specialist firms that offer ways to share
equipment, office space, financing, purchasing,
marketing, distribution, and so on, small firms can
obtain economies of scale similar to those of large
enterprises. In other words, specialist organizations
in mature industries are likely to coevolve with
other forms of specialist organizations. For in-
stance, the wine industry in the immediate post-
Prohibition period consisted of a large number of
warehouses. Warehouses in the post-Prohibition
period provided much-needed storage capacity, es-
pecially for the smaller farm wineries. As the early
farm wineries dwindled in numbers, so did the
warehouses that served their needs. Interestingly,
casual observation indicates that the rejuvenation
of the farm winery segment that began in the late
sixties was accompanied by a growth in the number
of warehouses that performed several service func-
tions for the farm wineries, such as storage, ship-
ping and handling, and accounting. Another trend
that has obvious implications for farm wineries is
the consolidation among wholesalers and retailers
in recent years. Farm wineries are likely to be ad-
versely affected by a reduction in the number of
independent distributors. An examination of such
complex interdependencies between organiza-
tional forms will provide a more complete under-
standing of the evolution of specialist organizations
in mature industries.
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